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ABSTRACT. The paper discusses the debate on the human nature in the sophistic thought. 
Focusing on the "nature - culture" controversy it presents the evolution of the views of 
the sophists: from Protagoras’ optimistic contention of the progress of mankind and his 
appraisal of culture to its criticism and the radical turn to nature in Antiphon, Hippias, 
Trasymachos, and Callicles. The paper aims at presenting the analysis of the ongoing 
discussion, with the stress laid on reconstruction of the arguments and concepts as well 
as the attitudes that are associated with various positions of this debate. 
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The 5th century BCE is traditionally thought to be the time of humanist break-
through in Greek thought, which took a more systematic and innovative ap-
proach to issues related to man and man’s social life.1 The view of this radical 
humanistic shift, which took place in the fifth century BCE had become prevail-
ing already in late antiquity and was re-established in modern scholarship in the 
fundamental works of the German historians such as E. Zeller2, F. Ueberweg 
(1876), H. Diels3 and W. Nestle.4 Nowadays, this view is contested by many schol-
ars, and there is evidence that the sophists such as Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, 
Polos, Prodicus, Alcidamas, Antiphon, and Critias were continuously concerned 
                                                 
1 W. Nestle (1940) 263. 
2 E. Zeller (1869).  
3 H. Diels (1884) 343–68. 
4 W. Nestle (1940). W. Nestle (1922).  
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with the problems introduced by the Presocratic philosophy of nature.5 The dif-
ference between the sophists and their Presocratic predecessors is not that these 
sophists have completely changed the subject of their interests, but rather that 
their concern with the naturalistic tradition and the transformative answers giv-
en to the old questions were the basis and the starting point of the “ethical” and 
“rhetorical” part of their intellectual activity.6  
The preserved testimonies suggest that in this period the problems of philo-
sophical anthropology and ethics drew the attention of the representatives of the 
so-called sophistic movement, Socrates, members of the Hippocratic school of 
medicine, Democritus as well as orators, historians, and playwrights.7  
The objective of these anthropological enquiries was to identify the true es-
sence of man, that is the human “nature” which was derived by the sophists from 
the Hippocratic medicine.8 On the one hand, the philosophical tradition of natu-
ral philosophy understood man as a biological creature, a part of the world of na-
ture. On the other hand, travels and encounters with non-Greek civilizations,9 
combined with social and political changes taking place in Athens in the 5th cen-
tury BC,10 inspired a new view of man, who was now seen from the perspective of 
man-made progress, that is from the perspective of his own cultural and technical 
                                                 
5 G. B. Kerferd (1981).  
6 W. K. C. Guthrie (1969) 186: “He (i.e. Protagoras) was in the vanguard of the human-
istic reaction against the natural philosophers, whose contradictory speculations were 
bringing them into disrepute among practical men – each one, as Gorgias said, claiming 
to possess the secret of the universe, but in fact only pitting one opinion against another, 
each more incredible than the last."  
7 L. Jansen, Ch. Jedan (2010). 
8 W. Jaeger (1971) 6: “In this, as in much else, both the sophists and Thucydides were 
influenced by contemporary medicine, which had discovered the idea of human nature 
and based all its work upon it.” 
9 G. B. Kerferd (1981) 112: “Human laws, norms and habits of behaviour vary from 
community to community, and the more widely Greeks travelled in the ancient world 
the more apparent this became. Herodotus, himself a considerable traveler, seems to 
have set himself the task of collecting and describing the customs of Scythians, Persians, 
Lydians, Egyptians and others. He was not the first to do so, being preceded by Hecatae-
us of Miletus early in the fifth century. The second chapter of the Dissoi Logoi at some-
time after the end of the fifth century uses systematic oppositions between the customs 
of different peoples, and references to a lost work of Aristotle testify to a continuing in-
terest in Nomima Barbarika, the customs of the barbarians.” Cf. A. Dihle (1981).  
10 C. Farrar (1988).  




achievements.11 Consequently, the anthropological discourse of the time saw the 
emergence of a dominant antithesis of nature and culture (“custom”, “conven-
tion”)12 and the onset of the battle fought between supporters of the standards 
determined by “nature” and the upholders of culture.13  
The fundamental figure in the discussion was the “father of the sophists,” Pro-
tagoras. In the dialogue in which the sophist is the main character, Plato puts into 
his mouth the well-known myth that allegorically presents comments on the na-
ture of man, man’s relation to nature, and the role of culture.14  
As Protagoras says, after creating mortal creatures gods asked two Titans, 
Prometheus and Epimetheus, to distribute among different living creatures their 
appropriate qualities, with a view to ensuring their preservation. Epimetheus 
took on the job. As the less brainy of the two brothers, he provided the animals 
with everything he had at his disposal: strength, swiftness, size, fur, hoofs, etc. 
However, the foolish Epimetheus forgot about man, who was the only creature to 
be left naked and barefoot, weak and homeless. The misery of man was partially 
remedied by the wise Prometheus, who stole “the mechanical arts” and “fire” from 
Hephaestus and Athena. However, it was not until Zeus presented his gifts – “rev-
erence and justice” – that humanity was finally fully equipped and man gained 
the advantage over all other living creatures. Men, upon Zeus’ order, was 
equipped in equal measure with reverence and justice, thus gaining the ability to 
co-exist and live in society.  
In Protagoras’ story, nature is the starting point. The myth carefully unveils the 
consecutive stages of Epimetheus’ work. Seemingly a simpleton, he fairly and 
wisely distributes gifts and balances the strengths: the weaker creatures are pro-
vided with swiftness so that they can escape from the stronger ones, the small 
ones are made to have numerous offspring, while the large and armed ones have 
just few offspring. However, it is just Epimetheus’ omission that gives humanity 
                                                 
11 Cf. the vivid discussion on the problem of craft (techne) which is closely related to 
the idea of progress: F. Heinimann (1961), J. Kube (1969).  
12 W. Windelband (1901) 74: “It dominates the entire philosophy of the period…”. Cf. 
e.g. F. Heinimann (1945), W. K. C. Guthrie (1969), G.B. Kerferd (1981). 
13 The antithesis itself was known before, cf. G. B. Kerferd (1981) 112–13. On the concept 
of progress cf. G. B. Kerferd (1981) 125, E. R. Dodds (1973), J. Sihvola (1989).  
14 Plato, Prot., 320c sq. G. B. Kerferd (1981) 125 assumes that the myth is “in all proba-
bility based to some extent on doctrines of the historical Protagoras as published in such 
works as his treatise' On the Original State of Man.” R. Winton (2008) 92 comments that 
“the 'Great Speech' of Protagoras in the dialogue that bears his name (320c-328d), [is] an 
analysis of the origins and nature of human society, of particular interest as offering one 
of the few systematic rationales of democracy to be found in ancient Greek texts.”   
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the quality which elevates men above the world of beasts. The arts stolen by 
Prometheus from gods and the gifts of Zeus introduce a new plan – a world of 
culture and civilization, of organized society relying on the ability to co-exist 
harmoniously.  
In this way, the theft committed by Prometheus and the gifts from Zeus led 
humanity out of the animal state and created man, a member of society endowed 
with technical skills. Thanks to the arts, man – neglected and overlooked at dis-
tribution of natural qualities, although rooted in the animal world – managed to 
overcome this beastly element and rose above it. Owing to aidōs (which is rever-
ence, respect, or esteem), man became a social being; he was endowed with the 
gift of morality: feeling ashamed, obeying gods, and respecting other people and 
the man-made order.15  
The story Protagoras tells us is an expression of tremendous optimism, of 
pride taken in man, and a great praise of culture.16 Man, who becomes a human 
being and is no longer just a beast, leaves behind the brutish, the wild, and the 
primitive. He is equipped with such skills and devises such instruments that facil-
itate his unrestrained development. Protagoras’ optimism makes the sophist pro-
claim triumphantly that humanity rose above the animal condition leaving be-
hind the domain of savagery and becoming “good” and “noble”.17 
Thus, culture – the offspring of crafts, reverence, and justice – expresses hu-
manity and substantiates the stepping out of the limits of the animal world. It 
seems that Protagoras believes that education (paideia) facilitates the making of 
“noble” men and the ideas formed by culture lead humanity to sublimity and 
                                                 
15 C. Farrar (1988) 78: “…he (i.e. Protagoras) formulated an account of the human spe-
cies which entailed (1) that civil society is a necessary feature of human existence.” 
16 The issue of progress also appears in the text of Antiphon On Concord (Peri omonoi-
as), which according to W. Aly (1929) 150 has many similarities with the concept of Pro-
tagoras. The problem of progress is also discussed by Prodicus in the work entitled Sea-
sons (Ōrai) (cf. W. Nestle 1940, 351 sq.) and Critias (DK 88 B 25, 1-2).  
17 G. B. Kerferd (1981, 125) defines Protagoras’ view as “Theory of Progress” as opposed 
to the pessimistic concept contained in Hesiod (“Theory of Decline”) and the third con-
cept known as “Cyclical Theory of History” (Myth of eternal recurrence). The state of 
primordial savagery is so pitying in the sophist's eyes that – as Protagoras claims – even 
the worst of the Athenians are still better than savages that the poet Pherecrates por-
trayed in his comedy Wild Men (Agrioi) (Pl., Prot., 327d). E. Dupréel (1948, 34 in footnote) 
even argues that Pherecrates's comedy could have been written on the canvas of Protag-
oras' treatise.  




make it possible to transgress the laws of nature.18 Man is responsible for his own 
fate and is the creator of his world.19  
As it seems, the so-called “apology of Protagoras”, Plato’s account of Protago-
ras’ views presented in Theaetetus20, constitutes an appendix to the myth. The 
“apology”, however, no longer describes the creation of culture and the world of 
men in terms of the myth. Emphasis is placed on practice, on the mechanisms 
decisive for the shaping of human reality.  
The starting point for the discussion is the presentation of Protagoras’ famous 
dictum: “man is the measure (metron) of all things: of those which are, that they 
are, and of those which are not, that they are not”.21 This catchphrase, referred to 
as homo-mensura, determines a diversity of perspectives and introduces as many 
“worlds” as there are perceiving individuals.22 It eliminates any objectivity and 
introduces relativity, indeterminacy and subjectivity: all things always relate to 
something else, nothing is, but only appears. Consequently, the whole human 
reality is a result of an agreement between individuals: truth, good, justice, vir-
tues, wisdom are just terms which do not refer to anything real.  
                                                 
18 In contrast to the traditional myth, already present in Hesiod, of “five centuries of 
humanity”, which contains a pessimistic vision of the continuous degradation of the 
world, progressing from the Golden Age to the Iron Age (Hesiod, Works and Days, 109 
sq.), Protagoras presents an optimistic vision of human development based on a belief in 
progress. In this respect, Protagoras is close to the views presented by Socrates in Plato's 
Protagoras and Gorgias (both see the essence of humanity in culture and education). 
Perhaps this is why there are no great points of contention in the discussion on virtue 
conducted by Socrates and Protagoras, and there are many similar views, e.g. that man, 
thanks to culture, goes beyond his animal, primitive nature or their common interest in 
crafts as the tools for progress.  
19 The form of myth used by Protagoras is only a canvas of the naturalistic dimension 
that the description of man's transition from a state of ferocity to civilization brings with 
it. The free-thinking views of Protagoras, as evidenced by the beginning of the treatise on 
the gods, as well as the theories of Prodicus or Critias, in fact, remove the whole divine 
plan, so clearly visible in the poems of Homer and Hesiod and in the whole archaic Greek 
culture.  
20 Cf. Plato, Tht., 165e7 – 168c5. There has been a long discussion about the attribution 
of the views presented by Plato in the dialogue Theaetetus under the name “secret doc-
trine”. In my opinion, there are many arguments in favour of the opinion that Plato re-
produced the historical views of Protagoras in the dialogue. Despite the controversy 
about the attribution of the “secret doctrine”, the so-called “apology of Protagoras" is 
widely regarded as a faithful representation of Protagoras' views.  
21 J. Dillon, Gergel (2003) 10. On “man-measure” doctrine cf. G. B. Kerferd (1981) 86–87.  
22 Cf. U. Zilioli (2007). 
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Protagoras must have realised that this view of a completely arbitrary world, 
which together with objectivity is deprived of truth, knowledge, wisdom and 
learning, poses a lot of difficulties. For how is it possible for people to cooperate 
in a situation when each man lives in his own “world”? And also how do the an-
tilogical perspectives get reconciled between individuals?23  
According to Protagoras, the decisive role in the process of unification of the 
view of reality is played by education and persuasion. Education (paideia) facili-
tates the reconciliation of different perspectives and makes possible creation of a 
certain common, uniform framework of cognition and interpretation. Protagoras’ 
world, with the category of truth removed from it, is fully subjected to the power 
of persuasion. The inevitable contradiction of arguments is the starting point for 
a debate, for a clash of perspectives, for a search for the most powerful modes of 
persuasion (peithō), opening up the possibility to force an opinion that is "better", 
meaning more “effective” from a given perspective. This persuasive contest takes 
place on all levels of social organization, ranging from individuals to the states 
(civitas-mensura).24 According to Protagoras, sophists and orators are those who 
are able to form the opinions in individual souls and whole states, changing the 
views from “worse” to “better”, thus determining the law and policies of entire 
states.25  
Although on Protagoras’ view, the ideas governing the state situate themselves 
outside the categories of truth and falsehood and are based exclusively on the 
power of persuasion26, the sophist is again an optimist. He seems to believe in a 
prosperous world led by politicians looking after the state in the same way as 
doctors look after their patients, by such politicians who guard a specifically un-
derstood welfare and actually change ideas from “worse” to “better” for the state. 
Protagoras does not think that the extreme arbitrariness of the social world is de-
structive. Man is capable of rising above both animality and particularism.  
After the splendid reign of Pericles, the faith in the autonomy of culture was 
undermined and collapsed during the Peloponnesian War. It seems that the his-
torical events clearly demonstrated to the thinkers of the time that the faith in 
the triumphant march of humanity was an illusion which needs to be replaced 
with a reference to something that is more primeval than culture and that truly 
determines man. A group of the so-called “younger” sophists, which included fig-
                                                 
23 The response to Socrates’ arguments is the above mentioned “apology of Protagoras”.  
24 Pl. Tht., 167c:  “Whatever seems right and honourable to state is really right and 
honourable to it, so long as it believes it to be so.” (transl. by Fowler, 97).  
25 Pl., Tht. 167c: “but the wise man causes the good, instead of that which is evil to them 
in each instance, to be and seem right and honourable.” (translated by Fowler p. 97).  
26 Pl., Tht., 167ac.  




ures such as Callicles, Thrasymachus, Polus, Antiphon gave a second thought to 
the issues of human nature contrasting the ideals of humanity and animality and 
consequently making a radical turn towards nature.27 In this new perspective, 
culture is just a façade hiding what really determines mankind and drives men to 
action. This real measure is nature.  
These theses most certainly found their source in the study of history, observa-
tion of current events,28 and also in the interest in literature.29 This is suggested by 
Polus’s delight in wealth and power of the “Great King”30 or his sincere admiration 
for the actions of Archelaus, the tyrant of Macedonia, who as a son of king 
Perdiccas and a slave woman murdered first his uncle, then a cousin, and finally 
his half-brother, whom he threw into a well and drowned.31 In support of their 
theses, the sophists draw on examples from literature, just as Callicles invoking 
the song of Pindar on Heracles, who stole the cattle of Geryon by right of 
strength.32 Most certainly, the critical reflection over justice and the stimulus to 
radicalize views found the source also in the corruption and unjust decisions of 
the courts, in the functioning of the Athenian democracy during the Peloponne-
sian War, and in the tragic events of the said war during which Athenians gave 
examples of ruthlessness in thought and action, to mention just the cases of Myti-
lene and Melos.33 These observations provided numerous reasons to confirm the 
view that human actions are driven by highly egoistic motives.  
                                                 
27 E. Zeller (1869, 921): “Entgegensetzung des natürlichen und positiven Rechts" is ac-
cording to Zeller a “Lieblingssatz der späteren sophistischen Ethik”. 
28 Pl., Gorg. 470cd: “Very well then, Socrates, there's no need to refute you with an-
cient affairs; for these things that happened just yesterday or the day before are sufficient 
to refute you and to show that many human beings who do injustice are happy.” (transl. 
by J. H. Nichols, 55).  
29 Pl., Gorg. 484b. Callicles quotes Pindar: “And Pindar too seems to me to point to 
what I'm saying in the ode in which he says that “Law, the king of all mortals and immor-
tals"; and this indeed, he says, “leads, making what is most violent just, with highest hand; 
I judge so from the works of Heracles, since-without payment-. . . ”. (transl. by Nichols, 
74).  
30 Pl., Gorg. 483de. “Both among the other animals and in whole cities and races of 
human beings, the just has been decided thus, for the stronger to rule the weaker and to 
have more. Indeed, making use of what kind of justice did Xerxes lead his army against 
Greece, or his father against the Scythians?” (translated by Nichols, 74).  
31 Pl. Gorg., 471ad.  
32 Pl., Gorg., 484b.   
33 See the cases of Mytilene in Thuc. (III 36 sq.) and Melos (V 83–116). W. K. C. Guthrie 
(1969) 19-20. 
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The already mentioned turn to nature induced the new generation of sophists 
to believe in a set of “natural” and thus objective and generally applicable deter-
minants. In the view of the sophists, who might have been under the influence of 
Hippocratic medicine34, a man is a biological creature and a part of the world of 
nature.35 As human actions are determined by the biological aspects of our na-
ture – we are all born, strive to survive, and die36 – every living being must in this 
situation compete with others to satisfy its needs.37 As a result of the unavoidable 
conflict of interests, a fight ensues which brings victory to the stronger individual.  
The adherents of nature brought up three main arguments against culture and 
its order.  
Firstly, culture, by blurring that what is natural, constitutes a source of ine-
quality. It causes segregation based on criteria contrary to nature, dividing people 
into better and worse, as is the case with the difference in the status of all people, 
all the citizens38, men and women, freemen and slaves,39 aristocrats and common 
people,40 Greeks and barbarians.41  
Secondly, the established laws, the guardians of order, are very often 
changed,42 and since they result from a contract, their validity is limited. They 
constrain people and hinder the accomplishment of the profit, which is of supe-
                                                 
34 G. B. Kerferd (1981) 51; 57–58; 158.  
35 W. Nestle (1940) 285. 
36 See, e.g. the opening words of Gorgias’ Defence of Palamedes speech (DK 82 B 11a1) 
and Antiphon’s On Concord (DK 87 B 44), cf. R. Waterfield (2000) 259: “Self-preservation, 
Antiphon implies, is the ultimate natural law, and a great deal of his critique of society 
stems from this: self-preservation requires one to obey unnatural laws when others are 
watching; pain and discomfort are criteria by which we can judge that something is bad 
for us, and tends against self-preservation, and by these criteria human laws are bad, 
since they cause us pain.”  
37 DK 87 B 44 col. 2.  
38 Hippias in Pl., Prot., 337cd = (DK 86 C 1).  
39 J. Dillon, T. Gergel (2003) 293: Alcidamas of Alaea: “God left all men free; Nature has 
made no man a slave” (Anonymous, in Rhetorica Aristotelis, CAG 21: 2, p 74 Rabe). 
40 K. Freeman (1947) 139: Lycophron “the Sophist” (DK 83 4): “The beauty of high birth 
is hidden, its dignity merely a matter of words.”  
41 R. Waterfield (2000) 264: Antiphon the Sophist (F17 = DK 87 B 44b†): “This has led 
to our behaving like foreign savages towards one another, when by nature there is noth-
ing at all in our constitutions to differentiate foreigners and Greeks.” 
42 Xenophon, Mem. IV. IV. 14, 1-4 “Laws, said Hippias, can hardly be thought of much 
account, Socrates, or observance of them, seeing that the very men who passed them 
often reject and amend them.” (trans. by E.C. Marchant, 315-317).  




rior value as indicated by nature itself.43 Due to the limited validity of laws, any 
violation involves the evil of penalty only when the violating act comes to light.44 
Thirdly, culture enforces upon man permanent hypocrisy and conformism, 
making him create an illusion of being just and honest. Thus, culture obscures the 
truth about man by hiding his true essence, which gets manifested when the 
lights are out or, as in the story of Gyges, when a man can wear a ring of invisibil-
ity.45 Life in accordance with laws and customs does not pay, and those who are 
unjust but dress as righteous prevail.  
What becomes fundamental for this way of thinking is the antithesis of evi-
dent and obscure and the observation that the other hidden agenda plays in both 
private and public life a much more important role than the evident one. Not on-
ly does culture prove to be susceptible to deception, but – what is more – it gen-
erates it itself.46 In human reality across all its planes appearances clash with ap-
pearances and the winner of the sham contest is the one who is more skilled in 
pretending. So, culture condemns man to permanent hypocrisy forcing him to 
                                                 
43 R. Waterfield (2000) 265: Antiphon the Sophists (F 18 = DK 87 B 44 A col. 4.): “This is 
exactly what this investigation of mine is concerned with – to show that most of the ac-
tions sanctioned by law are inimical to nature. For laws dictate what the eyes may and 
may not see, what the ears may and may not hear, what the tongue may and may not 
speak, what the hands may and may not do, where the feet may and not go, and what the 
mind may and may not desire. There is no difference between the things the laws deter 
us from doing and the things the laws encourage us to do: both are equally inimical to 
nature. For what is natural is life and death, and life comes about through things which 
are advantageous, while death comes about from things which are disadvantageous. The 
advantages offered by the law are fetters on nature, but the advantages offered by nature 
bring freedom.” 
44 R. Waterfield (2000) 264-5: Antiphon the Sophist (F 18 = DK 87 B 44 A): “Justice, 
therefore, is conforming to the rules and regulations of the community of which you are 
a citizen. The way to gain maximum advantage for yourself from justice, then, to treat 
the laws as important when other people are present, but when there is nobody else with 
you to value the demands of nature. For the laws’ demands are externally imposed, those 
of nature are essential, and while agreement, not nature, has produced the laws’ de-
mands, nature, not agreement, has produced those of nature. So if your transgression of 
regulations escapes the notice of those who have made the agreement, you avoid both 
shame and punishment, but incur them if it doesn’t; however, if you achieve the impos-
sible and violate one of the inherent demands of nature, the harm you suffer is not de-
creased if what you do goes totally unnoticed, and not increased if everyone sees you, 
because it is genuine harm, a result of what others think of you.” 
45 Pl., Resp., 359cd.  
46 See the significance of the motif of deception, e.g. in Gorgias’ doctrine of craft 
(techne) in W. J. Verdenius (1981) 116–28. 
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suppress the natural. It thus conceals the true face of man, depriving him of the 
possibility to realize his nature.  
Ironic as it may sound, from this perspective the supporters of the “right of the 
stronger” act as the advocates calling for honesty to be reconstituted in relations 
among men. In the name of those principles, they demand hypocrisy be discard-
ed by legitimizing the natural human inclination to deception. They also require 
the introduction of standards and values adequate to the true human nature, 
which means standards and values that reduce everything to the ultimate goal of 
profiting and achieving an advantage. Particular emphasis is placed on getting rid 
of the sense of shame, which in their opinion is something completely alien to 
the world of nature, a product of culture imposing invisible constraints on man-
kind. As in the case of gods, who, according to the poem attributed to Critias, 
were invented by a prudent ruler to restrain and control people in situations 
where they escape the human control,47 shame plays the role of a fictional guard-
ian of culture supervising the sphere of life which remains obscure.  
The above essay is just an outline of the then considerations concerning the 
essence of man centred around the antithesis of nature and culture. The synthet-
ic and concise form of this presentation does not convey the most crucial aspects, 
namely the emotions and attitudes related to the views and opinions propagated, 
which are always closely connected with historical context, with specific figures 
and events under the influence of which the views and opinions were forged. 
However, it seems to me that the general nature of this presentation reflects the 
timeless character of the discussion, while the views presented may provide a 
universal framework for the debate, which has continued throughout the devel-
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